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Empathizing with France and
Pakistan on Agricultural Subsidy
Issues in the Doha Round
Raj Bhala*

ABSTRACT

Among the most contentious issues (if not the most
contentious issue) in the Doha Round negotiations are
agriculturalsubsidies. Developed countries stand accused of
selfish adherence to domestic support and export subsidies that
Developing
impoverish farmers in developing countries.
countries are blamed for self-inflicted wounds, caused by
stubborn adherence to protectionist policies, covering both
agriculturaland industrial sectors. Agricultural subsidy cuts,
as well as increased market access, are politically impossible for
developed countries to concede without reciprocal access from
developing countries, not only on farm products, but also in
non-agriculturalmarkets and service sectors.
There has been, and continues to be, plenty of dialogue
among the trade officials of WTO Members. Is it a dialogue of
the deaf? Do developed countries appreciatethat poor countries
face daunting challenges in reforming their trade regimes?
While the challenges must be faced sooner or later, do developed
countries understand the fine line in some developing countries
between aggressive trade liberalizationurged by moderates and
descent into a failed statehood dominated by autarkic
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Duke (1984). Marshall Scholar (1984-86). Member, Council on Foreign Relations,
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GATT Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2005), InternationalTrade Law (Lexis, 2nd ed. 2000, 3rd
ed. forthcoming 2007-08), and Trade, Development, and Social Justice (Carolina
Academic Press 2003). The Author would like to thank his Research Assistant, Mr.
Owen Andrew Grieb, University of Kansas J.D. Class of 2007, for his indispensable
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Symposium sponsored by the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law entitled: "From
Hand to Mouth, Via the Lab and the Legislature: International Regulations to Secure
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Development Editor, Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw, for her assistance and
support.
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extremists? Conversely, do developing countries appreciate that
developed countries may have legitimate concerns about the
economic and non-economic functions of their farm sector? Do
they appreciatethe progress made in reform to this sector?
This Article explores these questions in two steps. First,
Pakistan and France are case studies of the Group of 20 (G-20)
developing countries and the European Union (EU),
respectively. The problems faced in each country, in respect of
agriculture, are presented. For Pakistan, special attention is
paid to rural poverty in the context of overall economic reform
pushed forth by President Pervez Musharraf. For France,
emphasis is placed on how the EU Common AgriculturalPolicy
(CAP) works and has been altered since the 1992 MacSharry
Reform. Second, the G-20 and EU negotiatingpositions in the
Doha Round on agricultural subsidies are explained and
analyzed. These positions relate directly to the difficulties faced
by the likes of Pakistanand France in their agriculturalsectors.
Empathy is the theme underlying this Article. Neither side
should demonize or be demonized by the other. Both sides have
legitimate concerns, not the least of which is food security, a
constant worry in front-line states on the "War on Terror," and a
foundingprinciple of the CAP.
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We recall the long-term objective referred to in the Agreement [on
Agriculture] to establish a fair and market-oriented trading system
through a program of fundamental reform encompassing strengthened
rules and specific commitments on support and protection in order to
correct and prevent restrictions and distortions in world agricultural
markets. We reconfirm our commitment to this program. Building on
the work carried out to date and without prejudging the outcome of the
negotiations we commit ourselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed
at: substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a
view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial
reductions in trade-distortingdomestic support. We agree that special
and differential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral
part of all elements of the negotiations and shall be embodied in the
Schedules of concessions and commitments and as appropriate in the
rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as to be operationally effective
and to enable developing countries to effectively [sic] take account of
their development needs, including food security and rural
development. We take note of the non-trade concerns reflected in the
negotiating proposals submitted by Members and confirm that nontrade concerns will be taken into account in the negotiations as provided
for in the Agreement on Agriculture.
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, DOHA DECLARATIONS,
Ministerial Declaration 13 at 6 (adopted 14 November
2001) (emphasis added).

I. FROM THE FARM TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE

The economic position of farmers in a country-coupled with
attitudes in the country about the social role agriculture should
play-shape, and even determine, proposals put forth by negotiators
from that country in world trade talks. That is the simple proposition
that this Article explores, with particular reference to agricultural
subsidies and the Doha Development Agenda (DDA, or Doha Round).
There ought not to be anything controversial about this proposition.
Countries negotiate out of perceived (or misperceived) self-interest on
agricultural trade, just as they do on matters of war and peace.
Surely, if trade officials are tabling offers on cutting "Amber Box"
subsidies, restricting overall outlays, or re-defining the "Blue Box,"
the details of those offers should be consistent with their national
agricultural interests.1
What if, however, countries do not really seem to understand the
aspirations and fears of other countries? If the economic position of
farmers and attitudes about the social role of farming are so
important, then why is the Doha Round foundering over agricultural

1.
Familiarity with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture is assumed. For a
review of the key concepts, see RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND LEGAL PRACTICE chs. 45-46 (3d ed. forthcoming 200708) (manuscript on file with author); Raj Bhala, World Agricultural Trade in
Purgatory: The Uruguay Round Agricultural Agreement and its Implications for the
Doha Round, 79 N.D. L. REV. 691, 691-830 (2003).
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subsidy (as well as market access) issues? After all, the positions and
attitudes of the principal cohorts (developing countries, coalesced by
the September 2003 Cancdin Ministerial Conference into the Group of
20 (G-20); 2 the European Union (EU); and the United States) are
readily observable, widely reported, and endlessly studied.3 There
should be no surprises as to what impels bargaining positions on farm
subsidies; certainly, negotiators can expect what is coming to the
table and map out points at which proposals might intersect.
Manifestly, that has not been the case, nor has it been the case
ever since the DDA was launched in November 2001. 4 Indeed,
contrary to what might be the conventional wisdom, it is questionable
whether the principal cohorts empathize with each other's economic
That is not to suggest that
positions and social attitudes.
representatives of WTO Members are dullards; quite the opposite.
Regardless, exceptional intelligence does not always translate into
empathy, which, in turn, can lead to compromise. It is worth
inquiring whether economic positions of farmers, social attitudes
toward farming, and the linkages to negotiating proposals might be
better understood. That is also true for food security and multifunctionality, which are important concepts animating these
positions, attitudes, and proposals. 5
More specifically, Parts II-IV below discuss the G-20 developing
countries, the EU, and agricultural subsidy controversies in the Doha
Round. The point for debate is whether the offers are grounded in

2.
The G-20, an outgrowth from the September 2003 Canciin Ministerial
Conference, includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala,
India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa,
Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Kevin C. Kennedy, The
Incoherence of Agricultural, Trade, and Development Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa:
Sowing the Seeds of False Hope for Sub-SaharanAfrica's Cotton Farmers?,14 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL-y 307, 367 n.115 (2005).
See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, International Trade in Agriculture: Where
3.
We've Been, Where We Are, And Where We're Headed, 10 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001);
Sungjoon Cho, Doha's Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 165 (2007).
4.
See generally Cho, supra note 3, at 170 (discussing dead-locked negotiations in
the Doha Round).
Food security, of course, is a concept dependent in part on the country in
5.
question. Often, it is thought of in terms of self-sufficiency, as in China, India, and
Pakistan. Arguably, the EU approach under the CAP is adequacy of essential food
supplies-but not complete independence from all foreign sources. For least -developed
countries, and net food-importing countries, food security is provided (if at all) by a
combination of aid and adequate supplies of basic food stuffs from external sources on
reasonable terms. Subsidized food (e.g., through export credits) actually is important to
such countries, and subsidy cuts by the likes of the EU can have adverse consequences
(reduced supplies at higher prices), as the WTO essentially recognizes in its discussions
of agricultural trade liberalization. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision
on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Program on
Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries (adopted Dec. 15, 1993
and Apr. 14, 1994), available at http://www.wto.org/englishldocsellegal_e/35dag-e.htm.
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different economic status quos in the agricultural sectors of
developing and European countries, as well as contrasting attitudes
Particular
about the roles of agriculture in a modern society.
attention is given to facts about Pakistan as a case study for the G-20
and data about France as a predicate for the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP). In keeping with the opening proposition, it is suggested
that links between economic positions and social attitudes, on the one
6
hand, and subsidy proposals, on the other hand, do, indeed, exist.
Put simply, as Part II explains, Pakistani farmers cannot
compete in the long run with the European (or for that matter, U.S.)
treasury. Pakistan remains highly dependent on its agricultural
sector.7 Food security matters to this front-line state in the War on
Terror.8
Pakistani society is largely agrarian, and rife with
divisions. 9 However, Pakistan aspires to be the first modern Islamic
industrialized country, and not to be outdone by its arch-rival, secular
Pakistan has had this aim ever since it was led to
India.10
independence from British colonial rule by the Quaid-I-Azam (great
leader), Mohammad Ali Jinnah, while Mahatma Gandhi and
Jawaharlal Nehru brought India through the turmoil of the Partition
of 15 August 1947.11

As Part III discusses, French-yes, French-farmers are
increasingly worse off, at a time when the European public demands
that agriculture play a multi-functional role in European society. The
demands of the public, coupled with the difficulties French farmers
face, are the latest chapter in the history of the CAP, which was
founded centrally on food security. 12 Much scorn has been heaped on
the CAP by developing and least-developed countries, as well as by
the United States. Yet, the founding purposes and actual operationas distinct from deleterious effects-of the CAP are not well
understood. Accordingly, Part III also offers an economic discussion
of the workings of the CAP.

6.
The Author is not arguing these links are exclusive. As the Doha Round
negotiating record indicates, and as the United States position embodies, agricultural
subsidies and market access are part of a broader balance of concessions that involve
non-agricultural market access (NAMA). See BHALA, supra note 1, chs. 3-4.
7.

8.
agriculture
9.
10.
11.
COLLINS &

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, IN THE LINE OF FIRE 194 (2006).

See id. (discussing Pakistan's efforts to increase the productivity of its
sector).
Id.
See id. at 181-96 (discussing Pakistan's efforts to revive its economy).
There are many excellent treatments of this history, including LARRY

DOMINIQUE LAPIERRE, FREEDOM AT MIDNIGHT (1st ed. 1975); see also
AKBAR S. AHMED, JINNAH, PAKISTAN, AND ISLAMIC IDENTITY (1997) (discussing, inter

alia, the vision for Pakistan of its founder). On GATT, Pakistan, and India, see Raj
Bhala, The Forgotten Mercy: GATT Article AXIV:11 and Trade on the Subcontinent,
2002 N.Z. L. REV. 301, 301-37 (2002).
12.
See infra Part III.
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The two sides-Pakistan and France, or more generally, the G13
20 and EU-have been talking past one another in the Doha Round.
That is clear from the huge demands placed on the EU by the G-20
proposal for subsidy cuts and the comparably modest reductions
offered hesitatingly in the October 2005 EU Proposal.
Special
attention in Part III is given to how the CAP operates.
Part IV turns to an analysis of the G-20 and EU proposals. 14 An
explanation of the proposals highlights the realities of farming in
countries like Pakistan and France. Finally, Part V provides
concluding observations.
II.

ECONOMIC REFORM AND PAKISTANI FARMING

A. Diagnosisof Major Economic Problems
Perhaps no country has been at the front line of the War on
Terror, for a longer period of time and at greater cost, than Pakistan.
Perhaps no leader has led his country in this war at greater personal
physical risk than President Pervez Musharraf (he has survived no
fewer than nine assassination attempts). 15 If there is a link between
income poverty specifically, or a sense of oppression generally, on the
one hand, and the conditions fertile for terrorism, on the other hand,
then President Musharraf-a General and Army Chief-undoubtedly
is aware of that link.' 6 Indeed, he writes about it in his important
autobiography, In the Line of Fire (2006).17
In Chapter 19 of his autobiography, "Kick-Starting the
Economy," President Musharraf identifies the major economic
problems faced by Pakistan.' 8 To be shire, parts of his book are
excessively self-flattering. A reader might be temped to look at the
litany of Pakistan's woes and infer that the President dates them
from October 1999, when he took power in a military coup d'etat.
One might even conclude that the President exacerbates those woes

13.
See supra note 2. See generally BHALA, supra note 1. Pakistan is a member
of the G-20 negotiating block of developing countries in the Round. France is, of
course, a founding member of the EU.
14.
Space does not permit a full analysis of the October 2005 Portman Proposal
from the United States. This Proposal is analyzed in BHALA, supra note 1.
15.

See MUSHARRAF, supra note 7, 1-7.

16.
See generally Quentin Peel, Malaysian PM urges battle against "roots of
terror," not symptoms, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007, at 7 (interview with Malaysian Prime
Minister Abdullah Badawi, who notes (inter alia): "People want their children to be
employed. People want schools. People want economic programmes to enable them to
get employment and earn some money. That is what they have in common.") The term
"income poverty" is distinguished from other forms and measures of poverty, as Nobel
Prize winning economist Amartya Sen explains in DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 87-92
(1999). The various concepts and measures are defined in RAJ BHALA, DICTIONARY OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1st ed. forthcoming 2008) (manuscript on file with author).
17.

See MUSHARRAF, supra note 7, at 1-7.

18.

Id. at 181-96.
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so as to (1) justify his takeover and (2) show improvements under his
rule. That temptation should be resisted as Pakistan's problems are
objectively serious. Those problems include:
*

*

•

"

*

Corruption
Rampant corruption and cronyism in public and private
enterprises, including commercial banks and other financial
institutions, has traditionally been a fact of everyday Pakistani
life. 19
Mismanagement
Public-sector enterprises have been grossly mismanaged.
Examples of mismanaged public sector enterprises include:
Cotton Export Corporation, Karachi Electric Supply Corporation,
Pakistan International Airlines, Pakistan National Shipping
Corporation, Pakistan Railway, Pakistan Steel Mills, Rice
Export Corporation of Pakistan, and Water and Power
Development Authority. 20 These entities play a prominent role
in the economy, yet despite subsidies, have lost (as of 1999)
21
about U.S. $2 billion annually.
Physical Infrastructure
The physical infrastructure on which agricultural, industrial,
and service-sector development is based is decrepit. For much of
the 1980s and 1990s, there was hardly any increase in Public
Sector Development Program (PSDP) funding (e.g., whereas
funding was 90 billion Pakistani rupees in 1988, it was just 110
billion rupees eleven years later in 1999).22
Public Finance
Official coffers have long suffered from nearly stagnant tax
revenues. For example, there was an increase of just 50% across
the eleven year period 1988-1999, from 200 to 302 billion
Pakistani rupees. 23 This problem stems partly from an inchoate,
corrupt income tax collection system, partly from high tax rates,
and partly from a proliferation of taxes, the last two of which
The result has been large and
encourage tax evasion. 2 4
25
persistent fiscal deficits and growing public debt.
Investment
Decelerating investment rates and pathetically low levels of
foreign direct investment (FDI) have characterized Pakistan's

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 181.
Id.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 187.
Id.

24.

Id. at 186-87.

25.

Id.
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economy. 26 For example, the level in 1999 was $300 million;
while it was up 500% by 2005, the absolute amount that year
27
was still just $1.5 billion.
"

Human Capital
The level of human capital-a key source of economic growth-is
low 28 as measured by almost any benchmark, including
educational enrollment and attainment (with notable male29
female gaps), and health care quality and delivery.

"

Foreign Exchange Rate
For most of its history, Pakistan's foreign exchange rates have
been administratively determined. 30 To cope with poor balanceperformances, the government has nearly
of-payments
continuously devalued the Pakistani rupee, resulting in
instability and uncertainty for exporters, importers, and foreign
31
direct investors.

"

Foreign Exchange Earnings
Stagnant exports and declining foreign exchange earnings for
many sustained periods have led to large and persistent current
account deficits in Pakistan (e.g., $5 billion in 1999).32 They also
have been associated with growing external debt (e.g., from $20
billion in 1988 to $39 billion in 1999). 3 3 Pakistan has had to
34
spend 66% of its export revenues on debt servicing.

"

Industrial Capacity and Tariffs
Idle capacity has plagued almost all of Pakistan's industrial
sectors. 35 In part, high tariffs on raw materials and industrial
machinery have caused this problem. 36 High tariffs raise the
costs of manufacturing and make Pakistani products
uncompetitive internationally, which in turn exacerbate
problems with foreign exchange rate and earnings.

*

Energy Dependence
Heavy reliance on imports for petroleum and petroleum-related
goods, as well as edible oils and tea (the latter two of which are
of
staples for
poor
Pakistanis),
creates
two kinds
vulnerabilities.3 7 First, these items are price inelastic, so the

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

189.
193.
183.
187.
181, 187-88, 191.
183.
188.
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country is susceptible to price shocks and related effects when
prices rise. 38
Second, the country is susceptible to supply
disruptions, insofar as political or war risks become manifest
39
and adversely affect shipment from a supplying country.
The very diagnosis of Pakistan's economic blight is scary.
Unfortunately, as anyone familiar with the country knows, it is spot
40

on.

Given this diagnosis, President Musharraf dubs Pakistan-at
least as it stood when he took over in a military coup d'etat in October
1999-as a "one-tranche country."'4 1 After the President's coup, the
country would draw down on the first tranche of a loan from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), but would abandon its economic
restructuring program, on which subsequent tranches were
conditioned, simply to avoid politically unpopular decisions and
appease preferred interest groups. 42 Indeed, the President readily
admits that Pakistan nearly a "failed state," a "defaulted state," and
'43
even a "terrorist state.
B. Initial Treatments
How has Pakistan, at least under President Musharraf,
responded to the diagnosis? In brief, since 1999 the government has
taken a number of difficult measures designed to treat the
problems. 44 They include:
0

Accountability
The government strengthened mechanisms for accountability by
more rigorously prosecuting corruption cases (especially of high
level officials) and enforcing corruption laws, and through more
transparent, uniform procedures for drafting and implementing
45
regulations.

38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
The Author had the privilege of visiting Pakistan in March 2001 and
remains grateful for the many insights gained from that trip and subsequent contacts
and research, particularly to Mr. Muhammad Ali Nawazish Pirzada, Esq., a practicing
attorney and law school professor in Lahore.
41.

MUSHARRAF, supra note 7, at 184.

See generally id. at 120-34 (detailing

General Musharrafs takeover in what he calls a "countercoup").
42.

See,

e.g.,

JOHN

HEAD,

THE

FUTURE

OF

THE

ORGANIZATIONS 25 (2005) (on the subject of IMF conditionality).
43.
44.
45.

MUSHARRAF, supra note 7, at 139, 191.
See id. at 181-96.
Id. at 185.

GLOBAL

ECONOMIC
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"

De-regulation
The government fully or partially liberalized or privatized many
46
state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

*

PhysicalInfrastructure
Pakistan embarked on a physical infrastructure development
program, funded by a 300% increase in the PSDP allocation
(from 110 billion Pakistani rupees in 1999 to 300 billion rupees
in 2006), which addresses the needs to (1) boost water reservoir
capacity; (2) line water courses (at a cost of $1 billion) to stop
leaking and spilling; (3) encourage water conservation; (4) laserlevel all agricultural land (i.e., calibrate precisely the level of
farm land) to avoid wasteful water runoff; (5) provide safe
drinking water; (6) enhance irrigation and drainage systems; (7)
improve road and highway networks and upgrade port and
terminal facilities; and (8) provide reliable electricity and gas
47
energy.
Technology
The government increased the number of Pakistani cities
connected to the Internet (from 39 cities in 1999 to 2,000 cities in
2006), addressing the technology gap within the country and
48
between Pakistan and other countries.

*

*

*

Communication
By increasing tele-density (the number of phones as a percentage
of a population) from 2.9% in 2003 to 16% in 2006, increasing the
number of cell phones in the same period from 600,000 to over 30
million, and constructing a wireless local loop for rural areas, the
government enhanced communications services within the
49
country.
Government Expenditures
The President froze the defense budget (despite continued
tension with India over Kashmir, as well as dangerous security
issues in Balochistan, Northwest Frontier Province, and
Waziristan) in order to reduce public sector deficits and debt.
This move led to a cut in the deficit from double digits in the
mid-1990s to under 4% by 2005. The government also enacted a
fiscal responsibility law, making it illegal for the public sector
debt of the central government to exceed 60% of gross domestic
50
product (GDP).

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 189.
at 184, 187, 192, 194-95.
at 195.
at 187, 191.
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"

Taxation
Pakistan cut its tax rates, as well as the number of taxes, and
rationalized the tax regime to increase fiscal revenues
(essentially, though not explicitly, based on a supply-side
macroeconomic model). This resulted in a 130% increase in
revenues from U.S. $5.1 billion in 1999 to $11.7 billion in 2005,
and more than doubled revenue from 302 billion Pakistani
rupees in 2000 to 700 billion rupees in 2006.51

*

Human Capital
The government sought to enhance human capital creation by
building more and better quality schools, increasing enrollment
rates (especially of girls at primary, secondary, and tertiary
52
levels), and upgrading health care facilities.

*

Foreign Exchange
By freeing the Pakistani rupee to float on world markets and
thereby avoiding the instability and uncertainty surrounding
administratively determined devaluations, the government
stabilized the currency at about 60 rupees per U.S. dollar during
53
2002-2005.
Foreign Debt
Pakistan renegotiated the entire stock of its bilateral external
debt through the Paris Club consortium. This renegotiation
secured favorable terms for the loans, such as: a repayment
period of thirty-eight years with a fifteen year grace period;
paying off the most expensive loan and foreign currency deposits
owed to foreign banks; obtaining both debt relief and new loans,
thereby reducing the debt stock by no less than 30%, reducing
the overall foreign debt from $39 billion to $36 billion, and
reducing the annual debt servicing liability from $5 billion to $2
billion. (Given the contemporaneous decline in overall foreign
debt and the rise in GDP, Pakistan's debt-to-GDP ratio has
fallen from 101% in 1999 to 60% in 2005. However, this ratio is
54
still uncomfortably high.)

*

"

International Financing
The government raised capital directly on international financial
markets by issuing Islamic bonds (sukuk) in the Gulf States and
incurring dollar-denominated debt of ten- to thirty-year maturity
55
at interest rates as low as 2% above U.S. Treasury rates.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 187, 192.
at 193, 310-13.
183, 192.
at 187-88, 191.
at 193.
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FinancialInstitutions
Pakistan improved the efficiency of its financial institutions,
especially of key commercial banking transactions like money
56
transmission.
Tariff Reductions
The government slashed tariffs on raw materials and industrial
machinery, with a view to encouraging the use of idle production
57
capacity and stimulating indigenous industrial enterprises.
Energy Resources
The government developed the country's energy sources by
increased prospecting for oil and natural gas; constructing five
large dams for hydro-electricity generation; converting power
plants that burned imported furnace oil to ones that operate on
indigenous natural gas; and planning for transit fee revenues
and export possibilities in the event that oil and gas pipelines
are built in Pakistan to connect China (and possibly India) with
58
sources in Iran, Qatar, or Turkmenistan.

While widespread, these initial treatments are not entirely
comprehensive.
They do not, for instance, directly address the
problem of corruption at low and middle levels of administration. Nor
do they address long-term concerns about a return to democratically
elected civilian leadership in Pakistan.
Accordingly, the above
measures are not final treatments; they will undoubtedly need future
adjustment and refinement.
C. Trade and Agriculture
What problems does Pakistan face with respect to international
trade, and specifically in relation to its agricultural sector?59 Simply
put:
*
Poverty
"Poverty" is perhaps the one word answer to the question. By
any measure of income poverty, Pakistan remains a poor
country. 60 In 2005, GDP equaled $125 billion, up from $65
billion in 1999.61 While GDP growth rates have picked up, from
3.1% in 1999 to 8.4% in 2005, such growth rates are necessary to
keep up with Pakistan's growing population. 6 2 GDP per capita

56.
57.
58.
59.
and efforts
60.

Id. at 183, 190.
Id. at 183, 188-90.
Id. at 192.
See id. at 194-95 (discussing problems with Pakistan's agriculture sector
to rectify them).
See id. at 193-96 (discussing efforts to reduce this poverty).

61.

Id. at 191.

62.

Id.
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increased from $460 to $800 during this period, but that is still
only a bit more than double the absolute poverty line of $1 per
day - and tens of millions of Pakistanis live below that line. The
poverty rate also doubled from 18% in 1988 to 34% in 1999.63
*

*

*

Agrarian Society
Closely related to its poverty is Pakistan's population
64
distribution. Pakistan remains largely an agrarian society.
Over 65% of Pakistanis live in rural areas. 65 They eke out a low
level of sustenance through basic agricultural activities and
animal husbandry. 66 Moreover, their loyalties remain bound by
tribe and clan, and divisions among Sunni and Shiite sects run
67
deep.
Low Value-Added Agricultural Exports
Pakistan adds little value to what it makes and ships abroad.
For instance, Pakistan is the fifth largest producer of milk in the
world, but it makes almost no other dairy goods. 68 Pakistan also
has fruits and vegetables of exquisite quality, but with little in
the way of food processing, the country adds minimal value to
them upon exportation.6 9 The results of an agro-based industry
initiative have yet to be realized (including a white revolution to
establish special milk-collection and chiller-storage systems,
which will enable the production of butter, cheese, yogurt, and
milk powder).
Diversity of Exports
Despite recent signs of industrial growth (e.g., 18.2% in 2004 and
70
14.6% in 2005), Pakistani exports are not diverse.
Overwhelmingly, they consist of agricultural commodities, plus
textile and apparel. 71 Pakistan cannot hope to stake its entire
economic future on adding value in the agricultural, textile, and
apparel sectors. 72 Agricultural, textile, and apparel commodities
account for small percentages of the value of total world trade.

Id.; see also Asna Afzal, Pakistan, The WTO, and Labor Reform, 29 B.C.
63.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 107 (2006) (discussing growing poverty levels in Pakistan).
India, a fellow member of the G-20, faces a similar problem as Pakistan in respect of
mass rural poverty. The scale in India, of course, is vastly larger. There are 650 million
rural poor in India. See Daniel Pruzin, EU, U.S. Eye Possible Market Access Deal On
Key FarmProducts to Revive Doha Talks, 24 INT'L TRADE REP. 119, 120 (2007).
MUSHARRAF, supra note 7, at 194.
64.
65.
Id.
Id.
66.
67.
See id. at 275-83 (discussing the rise of religious extremism and terrorism).
68.
Id. at 195.
69.
Id.
70.
71.

Id. at 188-89.
Id.

72.
See id. at 188 (stating that agriculture and textiles only account for 6-8% of
total world trade).
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In contrast, 61% of total world trade is in engineering, heavy
industry, and high technology products. 73 Thus, Pakistan has
small slices of modest markets in global trade.
ForeignExchange Position
With gains in exports (from $7.8 billion in 1999 to $17 billion in
2006), Pakistan's foreign-exchange
reserve position has
improved from the dangerous $300 million in 1999, which is two
weeks'
worth
of
imports
(well
below
economists'
recommendations of keeping at least three months on hand), to
74
$12.5 billion in 2005, equal to 10 months worth of imports.
However, Pakistan's import bill has grown remarkably, and
outstripped its rise in export earnings. 75 The higher import bill
results not only from imports of necessary capital goods (e.g.,
machinery used to build new industrial facilities and equipment
to modernize infrastructure), but also from increased imports of
oil and other energy items that are necessary to fuel Pakistan's
industrial aspirations. 76 Accordingly, Pakistan needs to consider
balancing its import payment obligations with increased foreign
exchange earnings-gain, through higher value-added exports
and a greater diversity of exports.
What policy responses are prudent to deal with poverty,
particularly in rural areas, and the lack of either high-value-added
exports or a diverse export base?
In brief, the treatments include:
*
Agricultural Infrastructure
Pakistan is in the midst of major agricultural infrastructure
improvements, including: (1) boosting water reservoir capacity,
(2) lining water courses with bricks (at a cost of $1 billion) to
stop leaking and spilling, (3) encouraging water conservation,
and (4) laser-leveling all agricultural land (i.e., calibrating
77
precisely the level of farm land) to avoid wasteful water runoff.
These improvements, if completed successfully, could expand
78
arable land in the country by 2.88 million acres.
"

Agricultural Productivity
Pakistan is attempting yield-intensification schemes designed to
increase the output per acre of arable land, thereby increasing
the income of farmers. It is also working to ease credit access
and credit terms for farmers (e.g., increasing the pool of loanable

73.
Id.
74.
To be precise, foreign exchange reserves in the State Bank of Pakistan, at
one point in October 1999, stood at ten days worth of imports. See id. at 139, 191.
75.
Id. at 191-92.
76.
Id.
77.
Id. at 194-95.
78.
Id.
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funds, and creating a three year revolving credit system for
farmers that eliminates the middlemen to whom farmers must
79
sell crops in order to repay loans).
0

*

Industrial-LedGrowth
Pakistani exports grew roughly 125% between 2002 and 2006,
yet the country has not built an export-led industrial sector (in
obvious contrast to Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan,
the "East Asian Tigers" in the post-World War II era).8 0 In order
to do so, Pakistan must not only continue with tariff and nontariff barrier reforms, and encourage foreign direct investment
(FDI), but it must also aggressively market its products around
the world, in part though the Export Promotion Bureau (EPB).
Debt Servicing
Pakistan's ratio of debt-to-foreign-exchange earnings has
improved considerably since the late nineties. In 1999, its ratio
of 347% compared unfavorably even against highly indebted poor
countries (HIPCs), which have a 250% or greater debt-to-foreign
Nonetheless, Pakistan's debt-toexchange earnings ratio.8 1
foreign-exchange earnings ratio remains unacceptably high, at
137% in 2005.82 The country still needs to devote lower levels of
earnings to debt service.

Are the "dreaded words 'failed state' a "distant memory," as
President Musharraf claims? 83 Reasonable minds might beg to differ.
What ought to be clear is that it is not in the interest of the world
trading system, nor the global economic order generally, for Pakistan
to become a failed state. No failed state contributes to stability,
prosperity, or growth.
Certainly, whether Pakistan emerges as a significant part of the
world trading system, or slides back toward the hell of failed
statehood, does not depend entirely on the outcome of agricultural
subsidy negotiations. Other trade issues-including the extent to
which Pakistan must provide non-agricultural market access (NAMA)
to industrial products from other countries, and the reciprocal
concessions it gains on NAMA for its products-will affect its future
economic performance. And, of course, the outcome of the War on
Terror, in which Pakistan is inextricably engaged, will affect this
performance. Nevertheless, how Pakistan is treated by developed
countries on farm subsidies is one piece, small but important, in the
overall puzzle of its future. Not surprisingly, then, Pakistan-

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 189-90.
Id. at 192.
Id.

83.

Id. at 191.
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together with its G-20 partners-has urged the likes of the EU,
Japan, and the United States to cut their agricultural subsidies and
thereby give its farmers a chance to compete on a somewhat more
84
level playing field than the gradient currently perceived to exist.
III.

FRENCH FARMING AND THE

CAP

A. Multi-Functionality
Thousands of miles away from Pakistan, a different battle is
being fought over how international trade, agriculture, security, and
poverty interact. The battle is within the EU, and-in the Doha
Round-between the EU and developing countries. The specific issue
of contention is how the EU's CAP operates, and how (even whether)
it should be changed.
It is easy to lambaste the CAP. Has it not protected inefficient
European farmers for decades from long-needed reforms that could be
brought about by free trade?8 5 Has it not driven farmers in
developing and least-developed countries further into poverty, and
jeopardized farmers in other developed countries by causing
overproduction in certain products-mountains of butter and maize,
lakes of wine-and thus caused price suppression or depression? Are
not French farmers, in particular, infamous for being pampered and
obstructionist?
Study after study, especially by NGOs, testifies to the greed
underlying the CAP. After reading the studies, one might conclude
that it is better to be a cow in the EU than a denizen in a leastdeveloped country, since the cow gets a subsidy larger than the per86
capita income of the sorry chap in the least-developed nation.

See infra Part IV, § A.
84.
The first common market organization (CMO) under the CAP was
85.
established in 1962 for cereals and related goods. In 1964, CMOs for milk and other
dairy products were set up. The last CMO, for sugar, was set up in 1968. That year is
significant because continental European leaders, led by France's President, General
Charles de Gaulle, sought to have the CAP in place before the United Kingdom joined
the European Community (EC) in 1973. Then, and to the present, the United Kingdom
inclines toward a more liberalized view of agricultural trade than many continental
states, preferring to keep food prices low and thereby bolster the competitiveness of the
industrial sector through low labor costs. See Gerrit Meester, European Union,
Common Agricultural Policy, and World Trade, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 389, 390-91
(2005).
86.

See, e.g., OXFAM UNITED KINGDOM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS

111-19 (2003) (discussing protectionist measures, especially subsidies in the agricultural
sector, by developed countries that hurt developing nations and which are contrary to the
free-market rhetoric of these developed countries); see also Org. for Econ. Co-operation &
Dev., Agriculture Policies in OECD Countries: A Positive Reform Agenda, Nov. 6, 2002,
COMIAGR/TD/WP(2002)19/FINAL, available at http://www.olis.oecd.orglohs/2002doc.nsf/
43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/7d605fl2fed04929c1256c5d00368d88/$FILE/JT00134
699.PDF (outlining an agenda for agricultural reform in OECD countries).
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Politician after politician, in the U.S. and other agriculture-exporting
countries, demands an end to the CAP. Still, for over half a century,
the CAP has stood. What's more, it has been an organizing principle
of the European project. Why? The key to the answer is to consider
the role-or roles-of agriculture in a modern society. To what social
model of agriculture are EU citizens profoundly and legitimately
attached?
Agriculture is more than just growing food in an efficient
manner, with production allocated according to the Ricardian
paradigm of comparative advantage.8 7 It is also food security for a
country-indeed, it is about national security.
It is about
environmental stewardship for children and grandchildren. It is
about culture and identity. "Multifunctionality" is the word that
characterizes the social model of agriculture accepted in the EU, and
88
increasingly even among non-EU, free-trade oriented countries.
Thus, conventional economic attacks on the CAP miss the mark.
They do not acknowledge the multiple purposes the CAP serves.
Indeed, food security was and remains a founding purpose of the
European Economic Community (EEC) formed by the 1957 Treaty of
Rome, and of the CAP. Specifically, Article 39 of the EEC Treaty,
now Article 33 of the Treaty of the European Union, articulates five
specific objectives for the CAP, two of which are clearly about food
security:
*
To increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical
progress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural
production and the optimum utilization of the factors of production, in
particular, labor;
0
Thus, to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural
community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of
persons engaged in agriculture;
*

To stabilize markets;

*

To assure the availabilityof supplies;

*
To ensure
prices .... 89

that

supplies

reach

consumers

at

reasonable

The first goal is about efficiency. The second goal is about
fairness, and more broadly, the rural way of life. The third goal is
about certainty, and is indirectly related to food security. The fourth
and fifth goals are self-evidently about food security.

87.
See generally Daniel J. Gifford, The Robert E. Hudec Article on Global
Trade: Trade and Tensions, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 297, 300 (2006) (discussing the
Ricardian paradigm).
88.
See generally William J. Even, Green Payments: The Next Generation of
U.S. Farm Programs?, 10 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 173, 190 (2005) (discussing the concept of
"multifunctionality" as a social model of agriculture).
89.
Meester, supranote 86, 390 (emphasis added).
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As time passes, and the number of World War II survivors
diminishes, it becomes easier to ignore one-if not the primarycentral intent behind the CAP: avoid the food deprivations many
Europeans faced during the 1939-45 conflagration and its
aftermath. 90 Even today, who recalls that the EU was a net importer
of some food items (e.g., beef and cereals) in the mid-1950s through
the mid-1970s? 9 1
Accordingly, the CAP did not begin as an export subsidy
program. 92 Rather, it was designed to guarantee high prices to
farmers. 93 The mechanism to effect the guarantee, in essence, was
government purchasing. The EEC-now EU-agreed to purchase a
farm product whenever the price of that product fell below a specific
support level. 94 For any particular commodity, if the support level
exceeded its world market price, then the possibility existed that
consumers might undermine the CAP by importing a like
commodity. 95 Thus, the purchasing scheme had to be accompanied
by, and is still accompanied by, at least one significant tariff barrier:
initially, a variable import levy that would offset any difference
between prices in the European and world markets. 96 In other words,
a restrictive tariff policy was necessary to avoid substitution or
arbitrage.
Yet, during the 1970s and since, support prices set by the EU
have been far in excess of world prices. 97 Responding not to free
trade prices, but instead to CAP price signals, EU farmers have overproduced. 98 In other words, they have supplied the European public
with far more food than it can possibly consume. 99 The EU has dealt
with the surfeits in two basic ways:
0
Intervention Buying: Buying food at a support or intervention
price, which is above world market prices, and storing the socalled "intervention stocks"; or
* Export Subsidies: Providing subsidies to farmers through a
refund scheme to cover the difference between the internal EU
market price and lower world market prices in order to export
10 0
food.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 389.
at 394-95.
at 390.
at 392.
at 391.
at 392.

at 392-93.
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As to the first response, in 1985, for example, the EU had to buy
780,000 tons of beef, 1.2 million tons of butter, and 12 million tons of
wheat. 10 1 The second response is supposed to avoid endless increases
10 2
in food stockpiles.
The choice, which the EU makes, between the purchase and
warehouse on the one hand, and the export refund options on the
other, depends on international political and economic factors. The
choice amounts to a balancing act. If export refunds are too high,
then world market prices may fall because of the extra EU output on
world markets. If support prices are too high, then production
surpluses may be too great to stockpile. In trying to balance the
variables and deal with over-production, not infrequently, the EC
resorts to two other strategies: dumping food on world markets or
03
donating food to specific countries.1
There is another reason criticism of the CAP often misses the
mark: it is insufficiently nuanced. Has the EU applied all three CAP
instruments-production subsidies (i.e., price support through
intervention buying), variable import levies (i.e., tariff protection),
and export subsidies (specifically, refunds)-to all farm products?
The answer is "no." 10 4 Table I below shows the categories of products
to which the EU traditionally has applied the various instruments.
The obvious inference to draw is that the CAP does not distort all
markets in equal amounts at all times.
B. Social Justice
The contemporary concept of multifunctionality, and the
historical food security rationale for the CAP, explains why criticisms
of the CAP sometimes miss the mark. There is yet another reason:
social justice.
From a philosophical-indeed,
theologicalperspective, why are the income and work of a farmer in a poor
country more important than the livelihood of a farmer in a rich
country? If every farmer, like every human being, is made in the
image of a Divine Creator, then each farmer has equal human
dignity. There must be some basis on which to prefer the interests of
one over the other. One such basis is the doctrine, emanating from
Catholic "Social Justice Theory," of the preferential option for the
poor. 10 5 While all persons have human dignity, the poor deserve

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
(discussing
countries).

Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Table I.
See RAJ BHALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 373-450 (2003)
social justice theory as a justification for giving trade preferences to poor
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special attention simply because they are relatively worse off.
10 6
Pope John Paul II put it, "Suffering man belongs to us.

As

TABLE I:
APPLICATION OF CAP POLICY TOOLS
TO SPECIFIC AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
CAP Policy Tool
All 3 Tools Applied:
" Production Subsidies
(Price Support/Intervention)
" Import Levy (Tariff Protection)
" Export Subsidies (Refunds)
Only 1 or 2 Tools Applied, and Only in
Specific Market Situations:
For
example, just
* Production Subsidies
(Price Support/Intervention)
or a combination of
* Import Levy (Tariff Protection)
* Export Subsidies (Refunds)
Coverage Only For Processing
(i.e., no support for commodity,
but premiums offered to processors)

No CAP Coverage
(i.e., no support for commodity
or processed product)

AgriculturalProducts
Beef
Cereals
Dairy
Olive Oil
Table Wine
Sugar
Eggs
Fruit
Pork
Poultry
Vegetables

Oilseeds
Protein crops
(collectively, along with other
products, referred to as "cereals
substitutes")
Consumption and seed potatoes
Flowers
Flower Bulbs
Ornamental Plants

However, are farmers in poor countries relatively worse off? Of
course the broadly applicable answer is "yes." This response leads to
a second question, however: there are poor-or increasingly
vulnerable-farmers in rich countries, too. Consider the following
0 7
facts about French agriculture:

106.
The Suffering Person Belongs to Us All, L'OSSERVATORE RoMANo (The
Vatican), Jan. 17, 2007, at 3; The Rule for Charity: "Good Should be Done Well!,"
L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO (The Vatican), Jan. 10, 2007, at 5.
107.
See Martin Arnold, PoorerFrench Farmers Buck Income Trend, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2007, at 3. The conclusions that follow about French agriculture are drawn
largely using data from Insee, the official French statistical agency, the French
National Institute for Agricultural Research, and Eurostat.
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Fewer Farms
For the fifty year period 1955-2005, France lost 100 farms every
day.' 0 8 In that half-century, the number of farms shrank from
2.3 million to 545,000.109

"

Fewer Farmers
In the twenty-five year period 1970-2005, the number of French
farmers fell by two-thirds, from 3.3 million to 1.1 million." 0
Conversely, in the same quarter century, French farms have
grown in average size, from nineteen hectares to fifty
hectares.'
Overall, French farms are halfway between the
large, industrialized farms of Northern Europe and the small,
11 2
family farms of Southern and Eastern Europe.

"

Poorer Farmers
French farmers are becoming poorer. In 1997, 13% of them
earned less than half of the French median income.11 3 By 2003,
the figure was 15.9%.114 To boost their income, more of themand their spouses-are taking non-farm second jobs.'1 5 In 1997,
the share of non-agricultural income in the average French
farming household was 19%.116 By 2003, it was 31%.117

•

Relative Deprivation in the EU
Theoretically, the concept of income poverty is poignant in a
relative sense. Thus, relative income deprivation is all the more
vexing for French farmers. In recent years across the EU, the
118
average EU farmer has experienced rising farm income.
Indeed, in Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and
the ten new member states that joined the EU effective 2005,
farmers have benefited from dramatically rising incomes. 119
However, during the same period 2000-2006, the incomes of
120
Belgian, Greek, Italian, and French farmers have fallen.

108.
109.

Id.
Id.

110.

Id.

111.
112.
113.

Id.
See id. (quoting Arnaud Petit of Copa-cocega, the European farming union).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

114.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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Relative Deprivation within France
Within France, between 1997 and 2003, the average household
experienced an income rise of 1.8% per annum, while the
average farm household income dropped 1.8% per year. 121 Even
if (or when) the absolute income level of French farm households
is equal or slightly above that of non-farm families, the former
cohort is worse off. 1 22 Since French farm families tend to be
larger than French non-farm families (3.2 members versus 2.4
123
members), their per capita income is generally lower.

*

Fewer Exports
While France is the biggest agricultural producer in the EU in
terms of value as of 2004, the annual rate of its exports
contracted from a 3.3% increase in 1999 to a 3.4% decrease in
2004.124

These facts are all the more poignant because they relate to the
French. Free traders heap blame on French farmers for being among
the most recalcitrant constituencies in the world trade community.
Did they not nearly scupper the Uruguay Round, forcing a 1992 Blair
House Accord and the creation of the "Blue Box" of subsidies for
production set-aside payments (and then only after the U.S. had
prevailed in the infamous Oilseeds dispute)? 125
Did they not
persistently and vociferously object to concessions by the EU in the
Doha Round on agricultural tariff cuts and trimmings of the sensitive

product

list?126

C. Operationof the CAP
The core of the problem of over-production has been the level at
which the EU sets support prices. This level is above not only the
world market price that exists outside the EU and would exist in the
EU with free trade and absent a CAP, but also above the price at
which domestic EU demand and domestic EU supply would be in
equilibrium without any importation of food items. 127 In other words,
the level at which the EU commits itself to intervene, and thus

121.
Id.
122.
See id. (citing Insee's argument that French farmers are worse off than the
average household because they have more children).
123.
Id.
124.
Id.
125.

See RAM BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 199-

200 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the weakness of pre-Uruguay Round Dispute Resolution
in the context of the Oilseeds case, which took four and a half years to resolve).
126.
See Alan Beattie, France Opposes More Farm Cuts, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2007, at 5 (describing how France said it would not accept deeper cuts in farm import
tariffs from that which the European Union had already offered).
127.
PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY
AND POLICY 198-99 (6th ed. 2003).
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guarantees to farmers, is above the EU market-clearing equilibrium
price. 128 Consequently, but for the CAP, the EU would be a net
importer of food. 129 Of course, that is exactly the situation the CAP
founders sought to avoid.
The graph below shows the operation of the CAP subsidy
schemes 130 and alternative price scenarios. The internal EU price
without the CAP and without the EU importing food is pEU (where
"EU" stands for "European Union"). At pEU, domestic supply and
demand are in equilibrium. At this price, EU farmers produce QE,
and EU families buy QE. The domestic market clears. At pCAP, the
EU pays farmers at an above-equilibrium level. Farmers have an
incentive to produce QSCAP (standing for "supply under the CAP").
Yet, EU families buy only QDCAP (standing for "demand under the
CAP"). The difference between QScAP and QDCAP is what the EU is
obligated to buy and store. To avoid purchasing and warehousing
this difference, the EU pays farmers to export this surplus. PWM is
the world market price. If this level prevailed in the EU, then the EU
would have to import food. That is because EU families would
demand QDWM, but EU farmers would produce only QSWM.
The
difference would come from abroad.
In sum, PEU is a market-clearing autarky price, pcAP is an
interventionist price that generates an exportable surplus, and PwM is
a free-trade price at which foreign nations have a comparative
advantage in agriculture. Further, the graph below embodies the two
kinds of CAP subsidies EU farmers receive.
First, they are
guaranteed the support price, PCAP.
This support is linked to
output-in effect, a production subsidy. Second, they receive the
difference between the internal price PEU and world market price pwM
for whatever output they ship overseas-in effect, an export subsidy.
The EU uses the export subsidy to dispose of the surplus resulting
from the production subsidy.
Consequently, the graph also shows the cost of subsidization to
the EU. That cost is the area ABQSCAPQDcAP. It reflects the quantity
exported (QSCAP versus QDCAP) multiplied by the value of the total
subsidy (PcAP versus pwM, reflecting the production support, pcAP
versus pEU, and export support, pEU versus PwM). Finally, consider

effects on Consumer and Producer Surplus of the different price

128.
Id.
129.
Id.
130.
See id. at 198-200 (The Graph is adapted from Professors Krugman and
Obstfeld and closely resembles the Neo-Classical economic analysis of a generic export
subsidy from the perspective of the subsidizing country. In this Graph, for any
particular farm product, the EU pays farmers an export subsidy equal to the difference
between the price in the EU and world market price); See Meester, supra note 86, at
389-412 (The Charts are adapted from Professor Meester).

972

[VOL. 40:'949

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

scenarios. At which price level are EU consumers best off? At which
price level are EU farmers best off?
GRAPH:

CAP SUBSIDIES,

OVER-PRODUCTION. AND EXPORTABLE SURPLUSES

Price
EU Supply

CAP
Support

B
pCA

Price

EU Price

pE

wiout
CAP or Imports
World
Market
EU Demand

Price

0

QDCAP

QSWM

QE

QDWM

QSCAP

Quantity
As Charts I and II below indicate, the analysis above can be
embellished with some important details about the actual operation
of the CAP as it developed in the 1960s and as it has been reformed
since then. There are actually four key prices:
*
World Market Price, PwM--The EU gauges the world market
price based on CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) prices to
31
principal European harbors.'

131.

Meester, supra note 85, at 391-92.
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0

Target Price, PT-The EU Ministers of Agriculture meet
annually to establish a desired internal (i.e., domestic EU) price
for agricultural products, namely a Target Price. 132 From the
Target Price, PT, with respect to imports into the most
significant EU ports (e.g., cereals shipped to Rotterdam), the EU
Agriculture Ministers derive a minimum import price, also
133
known as a threshold price.

0

Internal Market Price, PEU-In fact, the price in the EU for a
particular agricultural product might not exactly equal the
desired target, pT.134 Rather, depending on market conditions,
the actual price PEU may vary between pT and the Intervention
Price (discussed below). 135 For example, if the EU experiences a
deficit in the product in question, then the internal market price
equals or exceeds pT.136 If there is an internal surplus, then the
internal market price could be at or below the Intervention
13 7
Price.
Intervention Price, P'-As indicated earlier, if and when markets
for particular farm products in the EU do not clear, the EU
purchases and stores the excess supply. 138 Each EU member
state has an "intervention office," and this office is legally
obligated to buy surplus production at the designated
Intervention Price, pI.13 9 In the graph above and the earlier
discussion, this price is called the Support Price, pcAP, which is a
term by which the Intervention Price also is known. 140 In brief,
the Intervention Price provides a guaranteed safety net141
support-to farmers.

*

The CAP is designed to keep internal prices high (i.e., pT above
PwM) thus guaranteeing income to both farmers and food production
for consumers. 142 To assure this differential, tariff protection is a key
element of the CAP. Traditionally, the EU has imposed a variable
import levy or tariff on farm imports that adjusts with any changes in

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

140.

See supra Part III.C.

141.
See Meester, supra note 85, at 391-92. In the Graph, PCAP is above PEU,
indicating active intervention buying by the EU. In the Chart, PI (akin to PEu) is below
pEu, highlighting both the role of PI as a minimum guaranteed floor price, and the
reductions in this floor owing to CAP reforms. Furthermore, in the Graph, pEu reflects
market clearing under autarky. In contrast, autarky is not assumed in the Charts.
142.

Id.
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the gap between internal prices (PI) and CIF prices (PWM).143 Any
collected revenue would be applied toward the costs of agricultural
raw materials in exported livestock and
programs such as feed and
144
other processed products.
CHARTS:
OPERATION OF THE

CAP

Chart I: Pre-1992 MacSharry Reform

Variable
Import

pEU

Levy
Export
Refund
P1

pWM

pWM

Zero
Import Market

143.
144.

Id.

Id.

Internal (Domestic)
Market

Export Market
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Chart II: After MacSharry Reform,
Agenda 2000, 2003 Mid-Term Review
Decoupled Single
Farm Payment
Bound or
Applied

pEU

Tariff
Export
Refund

pwM

pWM

Zero
Import Market

Internal (Domestic)
Market

Export Market

It is important to note that intervention and export refunds are a
cost to the EU, as are direct income payments to farmers. These
grown
support-have
income
particular,
expenditures-in
considerably in recent decades. The whole system, which comes
within the EU budget, is operated by the European Guidance and
Guarantee Fund for Agriculture. Overall, the CAP consumes about
forty percent of the EU budget (and France gets about twenty percent
of CAP outlays). 145 However, the system is not sustainable, and less
so as EU membership expands to twenty-seven (as of January 2007)
146
from its base of six founding states, and possibly beyond.
Indeed, a key factor behind Agenda 2000 was enlargementconsumers in new Central and Eastern European member states had
less purchasing power than Western European consumers, and could
not afford high internal market prices. 147 Conversely, the EU could
not afford to make farmers in these states rich by paying high
support prices for their output-which, of course, would exacerbate
over-production problems anyway. 148 On May 1, 2004, when the EU
expanded by ten states, farmers in the new member states

145.
Arnold, supra note 107, at 3 (indicating that the CAP is scheduled for
review in 2012 and renegotiation in 2013).
146.
Meester, supra note 85, at 404.
147.
Id. at 400.
Id.
148.
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immediately became entitled to CAP market measures. 149 However,
their entitlement to direct income payments is phased in across ten
15 0
years.
Moreover, funding is co-financed, in part by the EU, and in part
by national budgets and rural development schemes at the member
state level. 151 That is, in July 2004, the CAP was altered to bifurcate
subsidies into levels: a basic level of set payments provided by the
EU; and an added amount provided at a devolved level, namely,
national governments. 152 This reform was essential to securing
French farming acquiescence to Polish entry into the EU. 153 The
French concern was that if subsidy payment sources were not split
between supra-national and national levels, then the EU would be
forced to cut subsidies because membership enlargement would
154
stretch its budget.
The two charts above illustrate the operation of the CAP based
on the four aforementioned prices. Chart I is the CAP as initially
established, while Chart II shows the shift toward direct income
support following the 1992 MacSharry Reform (discussed below). The
following are key common points and differences between the charts:
"

Each chart depicts three markets for agricultural products
(commodities or processed): imports into the EU, the internal
(domestic) EU market, and exports from the EU.

*

Movement from left to right on each chart indicates importation
of agricultural products (the left-hand most panel), the EU
domestic market (the middle panel), and exportation of
agricultural products (the right-hand most panel).

"

On each chart, upward movement bespeaks rising prices.

*

In each chart, in the two external markets, the World Market
Price PWM is the only relevant benchmark. At no point does pWM
prevail in the internal market. Rather, the internal market is
characterized by an actual price PEU; a government determined
Target Price pT (which is the highest of all prices); and a
government-set floor price that, if struck, will trigger official
purchases and stockpiling PI to support farmers.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 404-05.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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0

Regarding imports, the tariff is a variable levy in Chart I, but a
fixed duty in Chart II. With a target to preserve, and with a
hope of eschewing intervention, the EU adjusts the level of
The higher pT is in
protection, hence the variable levy.
comparison with pWM, the larger the levy. With direct income
support, the tariff can be, and is, fixed.

0

Regarding the internal market, Chart I shows pT, whereas Chart
II displays in its place a level of direct income support. In Chart
II, the tariff rate is less important, in a sense, than in Chart I,
because the tariff is not centrally aimed at avoiding the
undermining of pT. Also, regarding the internal market, both
charts indicate PI. However, Chart II shows a lower PI than
Chart I, reflecting the cuts in support prices pursuant to CAP
reforms.

0

Both charts show the World Market Price, PWM,which is relevant
to importation and exportation since it is the amount the EU
would pay for non-EU farm products and the amount EU
farmers would receive for exporting their goods. 155 However, as
both charts indicate, EU farmers also receive a subsidy-the
export refund-if they ship their goods overseas. 156 The lower
PWM is in comparison with pEU, the greater the refund.
D. The 1992 MacSharry Reform, Agenda 2000,
and the 2003 De-Coupling

One subsidy does not cure another. The CAP export subsidy
regime is one scheme trying to cure a distortion-over-productioncaused by the initial subsidy scheme linking payments to
production. 157 However, the regime only makes matters worse.
Higher levels of EU farm exports, encouraged by export subsidies,
tend to depress (or suppress) world market prices. 158 In turn, the gap
between EU support levels and world market prices yawns (or at
least remains large). As the gap grows, the EU pays a larger subsidy,
which in turn exacerbates the problem of over-production and leads to
yet greater exportable surpluses. A vicious cycle, as it were, occurs.
De-linking subsidies from production is an obvious way to deal
with the cycle. On a few occasions, the EU has made reforms
designed to de-couple payments from output. 1 59 In 1992, the EU
approved the "MacSharry Reform" (named after the EU Agricultural

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 392, 398.
Id.
KRUGMAN, supra note 127, at 197-99.
Id.
Meester, supra note 85, at 398.
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Commissioner who served from 1989-92).160 This reform measure cut
support
(intervention)
prices
and
mandated
production
restrictions. 16 1 The EU eliminated all price support for oilseeds and
protein crops, and cut production by twenty percent and thirty-three
percent for beef and cereals, respectively. 162 But, to assist producers,
they allowed for direct income payments to farmers. 163 The variables
in the formula to determine income compensation are historical areas
under cultivation, yield, and livestock units. 16 4 Such payments are
conditional on set asides, i.e., farmers taking arable land out of
cultivation (for crops), or establishing maximum densities per hectare
65
(for livestock). 1
The MacSharry Reform heralded a fundamental change in CAP
philosophy. As initially conceived, the CAP required farmers to earn
income from the market, but the government would intervene as
necessary to affect prices. 16 6 With the reform, the EU began backing
16 7
away from intervention, and moving toward direct income support.
Following the MacSharry Reform, the EU successfully pushed for
creation of a "Blue Box" during Uruguay Round negotiations on the
Agreement on Agriculture. 168 The 1992 deal creating this Box is
known as the "Blair House Accord" (after the Washington, D.C.,
location where it was reached). 16 9 Subsidies that pay farmers based
on setting aside parts of their fields are exempt from Aggregate
Measure of Support (AMS) reduction commitments. 170
In other
words, the EU's production-limiting direct-income support to farmers
171
goes in the Blue Box.
Bluntly put, without this deal the Uruguay Round would have
collapsed. Accordingly, it is sometimes said that no multilateral trade
round can advance until the EU forges a common negotiating
position. The EU cannot do so until it comes to an agreement over
hard choices about the CAP.
The MacSharry Reform applied only to beef, cereals, oilseeds,
and protein crops. 1 72 To extend coverage, and to prepare for a new
round-the Doha Round-of multilateral trade talks, the EU agreed

160.
Reform).
161.
162.
163.

See id. at 398 (discussing the European Union's approval of the MacSharry
Id.
Id.
Id.

164.

Id.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 399.

170.
171.

Id.
Id.

172.

Id.
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on "Agenda 2000."173 Under this amendment to the CAP, the EU
applied the MacSharry Reform to the dairy sector, made further cuts
174
in intervention prices, and boosted direct income support.
Significantly for farmers, their income payments are in nominal
terms, i.e., they are not indexed to inflation, and thus eroded by cost
of living increases. Moreover, the Agenda 2000 boost was not directly
proportional to the cuts in intervention prices. 175 The EU thought it
unnecessary to make them so.176 Because the price of EU farm goods
would fall given the CAP reforms, these products would be more
competitive on world markets-and EU farmers would make more
money the old fashioned way: namely, through free trade at a market
price. 177 Also significant for farmers was the express linking of
income payments to the satisfaction of environmental conditions, a
78
manifestation of multi-functionality.
In June 2003, in connection with the "Mid-Term Review of
Agenda 2000," the EU approved further CAP changes. 179 As with
prior reforms, the 2003 package aimed to reduce production surpluses
by lowering intervention prices and de-coupling subsidies from
output-in effect, phasing out intervention buying. 8 0°
The EU
decreased support prices for butter by twenty-five percent (across four
18
years) and skim milk powder by fifteen percent (over three years). '
As with Agenda 2000, increases in income support only partly
compensate for these decreases.18 2
The EU introduced
"modulation"-cuts in income support to large farms so as to fund
rural development initiatives. 183 Most notably, the EU replaced
84
multiple direct income payments with a single farm payment.1
Significantly, the EU entirely de-linked the single farm payment
from what a farmer produces.' 8 5 The policy underlying disengaging
income subsidies and farm production is to liberate farmers and
thereby increase farm efficiency. Without having to pay attention to
support payments, a farmer can make planting, growing, and
harvesting decisions based on market signals. Continuing the theme
of multi-functionality, in the 2003 reform the EU made the single
payment contingent on satisfying not only environmental conditions,

173.

Id.

174.
175.

Id.
Id.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

184.
185.

Id. at 400.
Id.
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but also on meeting standards on animal and plant welfare and food
18 7
safety.1 8 6 These contingencies are known as "cross-compliance."'
To be sure, the details of the June 2003 reforms are complicated
and crop-specific.
For example, that year, the EU stopped all
intervention buying of rye.188 In December 2006, just before Bulgaria
and Romania-two large maize producers-joined the EU, the EU
announced it was ceasing intervention buying of unsold maize
stocks.18 9 Eliminating maize-intervention buying cut the amount the
EU spends on purchasing unsold cereals (U.S. $496 million) by a
third, and cut the amount of maize projected to be in EU warehouses
by 2013 from 18.3 million tons to 10 million tons. 190 Hungarian
farmers were the worst hit. They account for over ninety percent of
the maize stocks. 19 1 Because their country is landlocked, many
preferred to sell maize to the EU rather than pay transport costs to
sell on the market. 192 The EU said it would sell off remaining maize
stocks over five years (2007-2011), and that reduced-price corn from
193
Hungary could be exported or used as feed for pigs and poultry.
However, under the CAP reforms, full de-coupling does not occur
for all products, and occurs only over a lengthy phase-in period for
some products. The EU is deregulating the fruit, vegetable, and wine
sectors, but not all at once. 194 It is especially important to shift away
from production-linked subsidies for raisins and tomatoes, which
account for large shares of the intervention purchase budget, and the
surfeit of which is either donated to charity or buried in a landfill. 195
Ending intervention buying for barley and wheat is also critical, but
is politically difficult. France is a large supplier of these products,
196
and tenaciously supports the CAP.
Such examples suggest that the sovereignty of individual EU
member states complicates CAP reform. Indeed, the states have
discretion to retain some links, on certain products, between income

186.
Id. at 400-01.
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
189.
See Andrew Bounds, Brussels Set to Bring Down Maize Mountain, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at 2 (indicating that Mariann Fischer Boel, the European farms
commissioner, aimed to cease intervention buying of unsold maize stocks before the
accession of Bulgaria and Romania).
190.
Id.
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
195.
See id. (indicating that Brussels spends more than €800 million annually
helping the fruit and vegetable sector, with tomatoes and raisins taking the biggest
share of the funds, the result being that the excess produce is handed out to charities
or buried in landfill).
196.
Id.
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support and output. 197 Therefore, the question is whether reforms to
the CAP are, as yet, sufficiently far-reaching to break the vicious
cycle and its untoward effects. What is unquestionable, however, is
that the reformed CAP adduces multi-functionality. Providing direct
income support is a policy about rural lifestyle and culture. Cross
compliance obviously bespeaks concern about sustainability.
IV. PROPOSALS ON AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES
A. From the G-20
Not surprisingly, given the cruel nexus among trade, agriculture,
and poverty in Pakistan (along with its G-20 partners), Pakistan has
argued for aggressive cuts in farm subsidies by developed
countries. 198 While farmers in developing countries might be able to
compete on a level playing field with developed-country producers,
they cannot compete against the treasuries of the EU, Japan, the
U.S., or other major countries. As Kamal Nath, the Indian Commerce
Minister, put it in July 2006, "Subsistence and livelihood security are
not negotiable ....
It's not the bottom line, it's the only line."'199 Six
months later, in January 2007, Nath echoed the sentiment: "This is
'20 0
not a matter of commerce, but of livelihood.
The G-20 Proposal emerged in the mid-fall of 2005, following an
October 2005 offer by the United States (the "Portman Proposal,"
named after the U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman), and an EU

197.
Id.
198.
G-20, G-33 Ministers Underline PrioritiesBefore "DecisivePhase" in Doha
Talks, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., June 13, 2007, available at http://www.ictsd.orgl
weekly 07-06-13/story2.htm.
199.
Daniel Pruzin, India's Nath Unyielding in "Confessional" With Lamy,
Repeats Demand for Flexibilities, 23 INT'L TRADE REP. 1089, 1089 (2006) (discussing the
non-negotiable nature of livelihood security and subsistence for any country).
200.
Alan Beattie, U.S. Farm Subsidies Weigh Down Efforts to Defrost Doha
Talks, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at 4 (indicating that rice is a case in point and
quoting Susan Schwab, US Trade Representative, in her statement that the U.S. is a
competitive exporter in rice and not by virtue of subsidies).
Research suggests otherwise. A paper presented to a UN conference in 2004
showed that American rice cost $331 ... per ton to produce, compared with $70
for Thailand and $79 for Vietnam. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's own
assessment of the rice industry, published last month [December 2006], notes
that U.S. farmers are losing market share in the two biggest rice-importing
regions of the world, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, because of
competition from Pakistan,Vietnam and Thailand, which "typically sell longgrain milled rice at lower prices than the United States."
Over the past four years [2003-2006], [U.S.] government handouts made up a
remarkable 39 percent of US rice farmers' total income.
Id. (emphasis added)
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counter-offer in the same month. 20 1 The G-20 Proposal covers the
three key farm subsidy topics: (1) domestic support (particularly
Amber Box subsidies), (2) export subsidies, and (3) the overall level of
trade-distorting support (i.e., the sum of Amber and Blue Box
20 2
subsidies and de minimis payments).
Table II below sets out specifics on the first topic.
Not
surprisingly, given the agricultural challenges faced by G-20
members like Pakistan, this Plan calls for deep cuts (indeed, deeper
than the EU or American plans). 20 3 Moreover, the G-20 Plan exempts
developing countries from Amber Box reduction commitments, if
those countries have not already bound their level of spending in this
Box.204
Because they intend to promote exports, or have that effect,
agricultural export subsidies are the most trade-distorting form of
farm support. The G-20 Plan identifies 2010 as the year by which
agricultural export subsidies should be eliminated. 20 5 Finally, a socalled "headline number" is the overall level of support. Here, too,
the G-20 Plan is ambitious. It calls for harmonizing cuts in overall
20 6
subsidies, as Table III summarizes.

201.
See BHALA, supra note 1, ch. 4, (analyzing these proposals, along with that
of the G-10, which includes Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Mauritius,
Norway, Switzerland, and Taiwan. The proposals also address agricultural market
access (i.e. tariff reduction and tariff rate quota expansion, and sensitive products), an
admittedly critical and linked matter, but one which is beyond the scope of the present
Article).
202.
CHARLES E. HANRAHAN & RANDY SCHNEPF, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERV., WTO DOHA ROUND: THE AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS 12-13 (2007), available

at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL33144.pdf.
203.
See Daniel Pruzin, G-20 Criticizes U.S. Farm Bill Proposal, Says It Lacks
Real Cuts, Subsidy Disciplines, 24 INT'L TRADE REPORTER (BNA) 192 (2007); G-20
Proposal on Market Access (Oct. 12, 2005), http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial
hongkong/docs/G20proposal.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
204.
See G-20 Proposal on Market Access, supra note 203.
205.
See id.
206.
Id.
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TABLE II:
G-20 PLAN FOR AMBER Box CUTS
Bound Amber Box
Annual Spending
Level agreed to in
Uruguay Round
Over $25 billion

Countries Affected

EU ($88 billion)
_Japan

Between $15 and $25
billion
$15 billion or less

Cut from Bound
Level in G-20
Proposal
80%

($35 billion)

U.S. ($19.1 billion)

70%

Other developed
countries

70%

TABLE III:
G-20 PLAN FOR CUTS TO OVERALL TRADE-DISTORTING AGRICULTURAL
SUBSIDIES
Overall TradeDistorting
Agricultural
Subsidies
(Annual Spending,
Sum of Existing
Bound Level of Amber
Box, Blue Box, and De
Minimis Support)
Over $60 billion
Between $10 and $60
billion
Less than $10 billion

Countries Affected

Obligatory Reduction
to Bound Level of
Overall Subsidies

EU
U.S.

80%
75%

Other developed
countries

70%

Notably, the G-20 Plan also provides that developing countries
should be put in separate bands and obliged to make cuts in the sum
of their Amber Box, Blue Box, and de minimis support. 20 7 However,
the Plan does not specify what those reduction commitments should
be.

207.

Id.
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B. From the EU
It should not be surprising that the EU rejects the G-20
Proposal. The agricultural subsidy cuts demanded by the likes of
Pakistan either do not acknowledge, or look suspiciously at, the
operation and reform of the CAP, and the increasingly precarious
position of many French farmers. The EU Proposal seems less
comprehensive and less detailed than the G-20 offer with regard to
subsidies. It lacks clear, bottom-line figures in all three topical areas:
domestic support, export subsidies, and an overall trade-distorting
cap. That is, first, the EU does not appear to have offered a precise
figure for CAP subsidy cuts. Rather, it repeats a mantra: the CAP is
undergoing reform, with a general shift away from trade-distorting
production-based support to non-trade-distorting, de-coupled income
support. The truth is that carrying out G-20 type cuts would be a
shock for many in the EU.
Second, on export subsidies, while the Portman Proposal (as well
as British Prime Minister Tony Blair) accepts the 2010 date for
elimination, the EU appears to refuse to match this offer. 20 8 That
refusal is expected because the EU spends more on direct export
subsidies-$2 billion annually-than any other WTO Member, and
accounts for ninety percent of all export subsidies paid by developed
countries. 20 9 The G-20 has had little choice but to watch the EU and
United States battle over whether the United States uses food aid to
dump surplus agricultural production, and what the appropriate
definition of "export subsidy" should be (with the EU insisting on
"parallelism,"210 meaning that all forms of export support-direct
payments plus export credits, export credit guarantees, food aid, and
insurance-should be included).
Third, with respect to overall aggregate trade-distorting farm
subsidy levels (Amber Box, Blue Box, and de minimis programs), the
U.S. offer attracts much attention, especially from the EU, which
rails against such a position. The Portman Proposal includes a cap of
roughly $22.5 billion, entailing about a fifty-three percent cut from
the current Limit. 2 11 The EU urges the U.S. cap should be $15-17
billion, which would mean real cuts from America's current actual

208.
See BHALA, supra note 1, ch. 4.
209.
Id.; see also International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development,
Doha Round Briefing Series: Agriculture, Vol. 4, Nov. 2005, at 9, available at
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/dohabriefings/Hong-Kong-Update/2-agriculture.pdf.
210.
See BHALA, supra note 1, ch. 4.
211.

Id.; see also Alan Beattie, U.S. and EU "Must Give Ground" on Trade, FIN.

TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, at 8.
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level of Amber Box spending of about $19.1 billion. 212 The G-20 is
highly critical of the U.S. position, saying that the American offer
could allow it to increase subsidy expenditures. 213 The G-20 queries
the U.S.: Why not limit itself to $12 billion? 214 In this debate,
however, the EU seems to emerge without offering an unambiguous
figure at which it is willing to cap aggregate farm expenditures.

V. EMPATHY

Manifestly, the G-20 and EU are far apart on agricultural
subsidy issues. The likes of Pakistan and France essentially are
talking past one another in the Doha Round. That non-dialogue is
adduced by the wide gap in numbers in the respective farm subsidy
proposals. It is the job of trade negotiators to bridge that gap. They
cannot do so without empathizing with each other, and specifically
with the farmers in other countries. There has been little of that in
the Doha Round.
Set amidst the technical complexities of agricultural trade
economics and law, the point is simple. Countries are negotiating in
the Doha Round over farm subsidies essentially on the basis of the
realities they face. Those realities include aspirations and fears. To
make progress in the talks (indeed, in any international trade
negotiation), empathizing with aspirations and fears is essential. The
short-run result may be less ambitious and slower progress toward
farm-trade liberalization. The long-run gain, however, may be the
avoidance of a collapsed trade round, as well as the bitterness and
recriminations that are now exported in large volumes.

212.
See Beattie, supra note 211, at 8 (indicating that the EU is asking for
another two or three billion on top of the current proposal from the current US
proposal of a 22.5 billion ceiling).
213.
Id.
214.
Id.

